Sunday Southerner – Issues in the News

When US President Donald Trump on February 28, 2026 launched what he called Operation Epic Fury that decapitated the top leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he told his countrymen the war would be over with five weeks.

His partner in the operation, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu exuberantly urged Iranian to take back their country.

After numerous deadlines and ridiculous claims of “victory”, Trump now says the war continue up to the midterm election in November. Now, the war has taken a life of its own.

From just bombing Iran while the Strait of Hormuz remains under the Islamic Republic’s chokehold, Houthis rebels in Yemen, one of Iran’s proxy militias, has made good its threat.

The rebel group has invaded Saudi Arabia’s alternate gateway to export its enormous crude oil capacity.

Saudi Arabia accounts for approximately 10% to 10.6% of global crude oil production and supply. It ranks as the world’s second-largest crude oil producer, after the United States.

The country produces about 9.5 million barrels per day of crude oil. Together with the U.S. and Russia, Saudi Arabia accounts for nearly 40% of the entire world’s crude oil supply.

The Houthis could choke Saudi Arabia’s oil exports without controlling a single Saudi oilfield because Saudi Arabia’s alternative route around the Strait of Hormuz runs directly into waters that the Houthis can threaten from Yemen.

The strategic vulnerability

Saudi Arabia normally exports much of its crude from terminals on the Persian Gulf. But the East–West Pipeline, which can carry about seven million barrels per day, allows Saudi Arabia to move crude across the kingdom to Yanbu on the Red Sea, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.

But Yanbu’s oil still has to reach customers by sea. The critical gateway is the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, between Yemen and Djibouti/Eritrea. Tankers sailing from Yanbu toward Asian markets have to pass through or around this area. Recent Houthi advances along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and their seizure of strategic territory around the strait have therefore raised the possibility of disrupting this alternative Saudi export corridor.

Reuters reports that Houthis do not necessarily have to sink large numbers of tankers. If they can make Saudi-flagged or Saudi-linked vessels believe that passage through Bab el-Mandeb is dangerous, insurers can raise premiums and shipowners can refuse the route.

That can be enough to disrupt exports.

Indeed, reports say Houthi threats and attacks have already sharply reduced shipping through the Red Sea, while Saudi tankers have been forced to consider longer alternative routes.

Saudi Arabia has substantially increased the use of Yanbu as a substitute for Persian Gulf export terminals. Reuters reported that Yanbu crude loadings reached about 3.7 million barrels per day in early September, although estimates vary by shipping-data provider.

If ships cannot safely leave Yanbu through the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia effectively has oil at the export terminal but fewer practical ways of delivering it to Asian customers.

The Houthis haf previously demonstrated the ability to strike Saudi oil infrastructure. In 2019, Houthi drone attacks temporarily disrupted the East–West pipeline.

More recently, the Houthis claimed attacks against facilities associated with the system connecting Saudi Arabia’s eastern oilfields to Yanbu.

If attacks repeatedly damaged pumping stations or other critical infrastructure, Saudi Arabia could be forced to reduce the amount of crude it sends westward even before the oil reaches Yanbu.

If Bab el-Mandeb becomes too dangerous, Saudi tankers could attempt to sail around Africa rather than through the Red Sea. That adds considerable distance, fuel costs and transit time.

Another option is moving cargo north through the Red Sea toward the Suez/SUMED system, but this also faces logistical and vessel-size constraints. The result is not necessarily an absolute blockade—it is a much less efficient export system.

With the successful incursion of Houthis, the world may be contending with a really dangerous scenario of a double choke point in addition to the Strait of Hormuz.

That would squeeze one of the world’s largest oil exporters from both sides.

The consequences would extend well beyond Saudi Arabia. China, Japan, South Korea and India are major Asian buyers of Saudi crude, so disruption of the Red Sea route would affect refiners and shipping markets throughout Asia.

The market is already demonstrating how sensitive it is: Brent crude has recently traded above $100 a barrel amid the wider Middle East supply disruptions.

But “choke” does not mean “stop all Saudi oil exports”

Saudi Arabia has substantial logistical resilience. It has the East–West Pipeline, storage facilities, multiple export terminals and the ability to alter destinations and shipping routes.

Moreover, the pipeline has demonstrated the ability to operate at about seven million barrels per day, giving Riyadh considerable capacity to bypass Hormuz.

So the Houthis’ greatest leverage is not necessarily destroying Saudi oil production. It is making the alternative export routes sufficiently dangerous and expensive that Saudi Arabia cannot move all the crude it produces to its customers efficiently.

In essence, the Houthi strategy is to attack the logistics rather than the oilfield: threaten the ships, threaten the chokepoint, threaten the pipeline, raise insurance and freight costs, and force Saudi Arabia to cut production if its export outlets become congested.

And the latest developments make this particularly significant.

*With reports from Reuters and Al Jazeera_